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AN EVALUATION OF GAULT BY A SOCIOLOGIST
ALBERT

K. COHEN-

I am interested in the contributions of social science and, more
generally, the contributions of systematic observation and detached analysis, to judicial decisions. The In re Gault1 case would appear, on first
reading, to be an impressive testimony to the significance of such contributions. Clearly the Supreme Court, in Justice Fortas' learned opinion,
insists on questioning the presumptions of fact that inhere in the official
rhetoric of the juvenile court and on examining what actually goes on in
the juvenile courts and the actual consequences of established procedures.
To this end the opinion marshals governmental statistics, the works of
sociologists, and the findings of research studies by task forces, commissions, and legal scholars. Nor can there be any doubt that the Court's
assumptions, documented by these materials, about the reality behind the
rhetoric are essential to their argument. In sum, it would appear that,
after some sixty-five years of the existence of the juvenile court, scientific
knowledge about the facts of juvenile delinquency, justice, and corrections
finally became, around 1967, so definitive and cogent that it virtually
compelled the Court to re-examine the principles of juvenile justice and to
conclude that established and traditional procedures were not compatible
with due process of law.
Nevertheless, a rereading of the opinion suggests that much the
same opinion could have been written at least fifteen years ago with
documentation somewhat less voluminous but hardly less cogent, so far
as the appeal to empirical reality is concerned. If this is true, then the
decision cannot be understood as the response of the Court to a portrait of
reality that only recently emerged from the data of governmental statistics
and scholarly research. The correct inferences would be, rather, that what
has changed in the last few years are the values and interests to which
the Court is responsive, that the decision gives effect to these changes,
and that the research data and scientific opinion are invoked because
they take on, in the light of these changes, a new relevance and meaning.
But the really interesting question, from a sociologist's point of view,
is how to explain the change in the Court's scale of priorities among
values and interests. This change, in turn, would explain the rich banquet
of data, impressions, and opinions at which the Court invites us to sit.
I shall attempt to show that the connection between the materials
tProfessor of Sociology and Anthropology, Univ. of Connecticu.
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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cited and the conclusions drawn by the Court is not logically inevitable.
One is then led to ask what the nature of the connection is. It seems probable that the scientific and scholarly literature, the legislation of California and New York and the decisions of lower courts (all cited in this
opinion), and the Supreme Court's decisions in the Kent v. United
State2 and Gault cases are phases of a single grand social movement,
and that the earlier phases of this movement served, in their cumulative
effect, to convey to the Court that a new perspective had been suf ficiently
well assimilated into legal thinking and had acquired enough legal
respectability that the time was ripe for the Court to place upon it its
imprimatur. But this still does not explain why the movement developed
as it did at the time it did.
In very brief summary, the Gault opinion argues that, notwithstanding the language of the statutes and the official rhetoric, the restrictions
and deprivations imposed by the juvenile courts are in effect punitive;
that juvenile offenders may, for the same offenses, be treated far more
harshly than adults; that juveniles suffer such deprivations, often amounting to miscarriages of justice, without the procedural safeguards against
judicial error, indifference, arbitrariness and malice afforded by the
Constitution to adult defendants; that the juvenile courts, however
benevolent and therapeutic their aims, are not in general well equipped to
realize them; that the statistical evidence on juvenile delinquency and
recidivism does not indicate that the special procedures of the juvenile
court are, in fact, effective; and that, therefore, the uncertain accomplishments of the juvenile courts do not justify the tangible and demonstrable
injustices that their procedures permit.
All of these assertions could have been made-indeed, were madewith equal plausibility at least fifteen years ago. Furthermore, most of
them do not and did not require powerful research, massive statistics, or
refined scholarship to establish their plausibility. To realize that deprivation of liberty in reformatory institutions or even the restrictions of
probation are experienced as punitive requires no scholarship or subtlety
of perception. That juveniles may languish in jail for years for offenses
for which adults could not be prosecuted or for which they could suffer
only fines or short-term jail sentences has never been a secret. That
juvenile courts exercise their enormous discretion sometimes with punctilious concern for the substance, if not the form, of due process, but often
carelessly and arbitrarily has been repeatedly noted by critics of the
juvenile courts for decades. That juvenile court judges are typically not
trained in the behavioral sciences presumably essential to their rehabilita2. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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tive task and often untrained in the law itself was not less true or less
difficult to ascertain fifteen or twenty years ago than it is today. That the
probation and professional services available to the juvenile courts are
generally grossly inadequate has been the constant plaint of the juvenile
courts themselves and the basis of their appeal for more generous appropriations. Statistics of juvenile recidivism have told much the same story
over the many years.' Rates of juvenile delinquency, as reported in the
juvenile court statistics of the United States Children's Bureau, have
been increasing steadily since 1948.'
I do not dispute the facts and I am willing to accept the Court's
conclusions, but these conclusions do not follow as irresistably as might
appear from these facts. It could be argued-and of course it has beenthat the juvenile court philosophy, like Christianity, has never really been
tried and that, if we supported the courts more generously, the results
would have been more rewarding. It could be argued that delinquency
and recidivism rates are determined by massive and obscure social forces
and that the juvenile courts can, at the most, make a marginal-which
does not mean an unimportant-contribution to their diminution- Furthermore, from such statistics one can draw no clear inferences because, in
the absence of research controls very difficult to institute, one cannot
say that the rates would have been higher or lower had the courts operated
under procedures more congenial to the philosophy of Gault. It could be
argued, as Justice Harlan did in his separate opinion in the Gault case,'
that the majority's critique of the juvenile courts was essentially sound
and justified the requirements of timely notice, right to counsel, and a
written record, but that to insist on the privilege against self-incrimination
and the right to confrontation of witnesses at this time is to impose upon
the courts a fixed mold and to inhibit the states in 'sorely needed experimentation with new forms that might be appropriate to the original
purposes of the juvenile courts without jeopardizing the rights of the
child. Specifically, Justice Harlan suggests that the various classifications
3.

For a convenient summary of the earlier studies, H.

SHULMAN,

JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY IN AMERICAN SocIETy 81-84 (1961).

4. The authorities that the Court invokes (apart from case citations) are, with a
few exceptions, taken from the large and accelerating literature of the last ten years.
The Court makes no reference, however, to the work of the late Paul Tappan, a legally
trained sociologist whose writings constitute one of the most exhaustive, informed, and
closely reasoned analyses in keeping with the spirit of the Gaidt decision. They appeared
mostly between 1946 and 1952 and most of the literature since then amounts to restatements and amplifications of the case as stated by Tappan. See COMPARATIVE SURVEY ON
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, NORTH AMERICA, pt. 1, ch. 3 (1952); P. TAPPAN, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY, ch. 9 (1949) ; P. TAPPAN, DELINQUENT GIRLs IN COURT (1947) ; Tappan,
Treatment Without Trial, 24 SOCIAL FORCES 306-11 (1946). Of these references the
chapter in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY is perhaps the most compendious.

5.

387 U.S. 1, 65 (1967)

(separate opinion).
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of juvenile court proceedings are arbitrary or ambiguous and that we
should not discourage, by prematurely rigid procedural requirements,
efforts to devise classifications to which the full panoply of due process
guarantees might be appropriate and others to which they might not be
relevant or helpful. Justice Harlan could have added that juvenile courts
throughout the land have been moving in the direction of Gault and that,
although we cannot afford to wait for the laggards to catch up with the
others in their own good time, Supreme Court intervention on the scale of
Gault is more drastic than the situation calls for.
On the other hand, the Court failed to make one of the most forceful
arguments for its own case-namely, that the failure of the juvenile
courts to deliver on their promises goes back to causes that lie deeper
than faulty institutional forms, incompetent and unqualified personnel,
and meager resources. It goes back to the fact that, despite the material
progress of our knowledge about juvenile delinquency, we simply do not
know enough to diagnose, predict, and prescribe for a very large proportion of offenders. If all our courts and correctional agencies were
staffed by Ph.D.'s in clinical psychology and sociology and provided
with unlimited resources, we would still not know in many cases-and
some would say in most cases-whether the needs of "treatment" would
be better served by letting the offender go free or by incarcerating him for
two or three years. We must, of course, do the best we can in the circumstances and above all we must continue to experiment with new
forms of treatment and to explore new ways of classifying offenders.
In the meanwhile, however, we must take scrupulous pains to establish
that the young people have indeed committed the offenses that, under the
law, justify the heavy-handed ministrations of the state.'
It would be hard to quarrel with the decision in the Gault case if one
takes his stand unequivocally on the principle that no person, regardless of
status or circumstance, shall suffer any deprivation of liberty at the hands
of the state except for causes clearly specified in the law and without a
full, fair, and realistic opportunity to defend himself against the charges.
The social movement I referred to above amounts to a more resolute
6.

The sociological authorities most frequently cited in the Gault opinion are S.

WHEELER & L. CorTREr.,
in

JUVENILE DELINQUENcY: ITS PREVENTION AND TREATMENT

PRESIDENT'S Comm'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK

409 (1967). It is interesting
that the opinion did not cite these authors to this effect:
[b]ut do we know enough about delinquency to specify the ways in which
even a moderate reduction could be brought about? In terms of verified
knowledge, the answer must be an unqualified no. . . . Indeed, as of now,
there are no demonstrable and proven methods for reducing the incidence
of serious delinquent acts through preventive or rehabilitative procedures.
Id. at 410.
FORCE REPORT: JUvENILE DELINQUENCY & YOUTH CRIME
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commitment that this principle must prevail over alternative or competing
interests that the law might serve. If one feels strongly enough about this
principle, then the arguments against Gault reduce to quibbles; the massive invocation of sophisticated, scholarly, and contemporaneous research
adds dignity and 6clat to the arguments pro, but it is like marshaling
a battalion when a platoon would do. A study of the materials that seem to
impel the court to its conclusion impels me to the conclusion that, although
these materials are useful to the construction of the Court's argument,
there must be another set of materials of even greater interest: those that
account for the social movement and the new perspective of the Court, in
the light of which old facts and arguments acquire a saliency that they
did not have before.

